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THE RETURN OF COVERTURE 
Allison Anna Tait* 
Once, the notion that husbands and wives were equal partners in marriage 
seemed outlandish and unnatural. Today, the marriage narrative has been 
reversed and the prevailing attitude is that marriage has become an 
increasingly equitable institution. This is the story that Justice Kennedy told 
in Obergefell v. Hodges, in which he described marriage as an evolving 
institution that has adapted in response to social change such that 
discriminatory marriage rules no longer apply. Coverture exemplifies this 
change: marriage used to be deeply shaped by coverture rules and now it is 
not. While celebrating the demise of coverture, however, the substantive 
image of marriage that Justice Kennedy set forth subconsciously uses 
conventional, historical tropes that construct marriage as a relationship of 
hierarchy, gender differentiation, and female disempowerment. In this Essay, 
I describe the ways in which Justice Kennedy used coverture as a positive 
example of marriage transformation while simultaneously invoking 
coverture ideals to inform his portrayal of marriage as a fundamental 
building block of government, the keystone of civil society, and a 
transcendental, lifelong commitment. 
Once, in the era of coverture, the notion that husbands and wives were 
equal partners in marriage seemed outlandish and unnatural. Under 
coverture, a married woman had no legal persona—she could not sue or be 
sued, she could not form contracts, and she could not buy, sell, or own 
property apart from her husband.1 Gender hierarchy, separate spheres, and 
marital “unity” defined coverture and its rules. 
Today, the prevailing narrative is that marriage has become an 
increasingly equitable institution. This is the story that Justice Kennedy told 
 
 * Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. For comments and 
conversation, my thanks go to Claudia Haupt, Corinna Lain, Shari Motro, Luke Norris, Sarah 
Swan, and Mary Kelly Tate. I am also very appreciative for Erin Whelan’s assistance and 
Andrew Xue’s excellent editorial work. 
 1. AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 24–
25 (1993). All “moveables” or “chattels”—which included money, clothing, jewelry, furniture, 
and other personal goods—that previously belonged to the wife became the property of the 
husband, as did any leasehold land. Id. See also Allison Tait, The Beginning of the End of 
Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
165, 167 (2014). But see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 483–84 
(4th ed. 2002) (“Like most legal fictions [coverture] was not universally applicable: for instance, 
the wife was not executed for her husband’s crimes, or made answerable for his debts.”). 
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in Obergefell v. Hodges, in which he described marriage as an evolving 
institution that has adapted in response to social change. Coverture, for 
Justice Kennedy, exemplifies this change: marriage used to be deeply shaped 
by coverture rules and now it is not. Coverture therefore provides an 
important example of how “[t]he history of marriage is one of both 
continuity and change.”2 
While celebrating the demise of coverture, however, the substantive 
image of marriage that Justice Kennedy set forth in the opinion 
subconsciously invokes marriage as coverture. The opinion uses 
conventional, historical tropes that construct marriage as a relationship of 
hierarchy, gender differentiation, and female disempowerment. While 
ostensibly rejecting old forms of marriage and setting forth a modern vision 
of marriage equality, the opinion subtly resurrects the presence of coverture. 
Obergefell has already been the subject of critique—both from the 
dissenters on the court and from legal commentators—because of the florid 
language used in tribute to marriage3 as well as the dated picture of marriage 
that the opinion presents.4 These critiques do not, however, explore just how 
regressive Justice Kennedy’s vision of marriage is. In this Essay, I describe 
the ways in which Justice Kennedy used coverture as an example of marriage 
transformation while simultaneously invoking coverture ideals to inform his 
portrayal of marriage as a building block of government, the keystone of civil 
society, and a transcendental, lifelong commitment. 
 
 2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015). 
 3. Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority opinion prose as 
“mummeries and straining-to-be-memorable passages”). 
 4. See, e.g., Michael Cobb, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s Lonely Hearts Club, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jun. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/opinion/the-supreme-courts-
lonely-hearts-club.html [perma.cc/N2U8-LK3K]; Claire Potter, Why People Who GayMarry 
Need Feminism, S-USISH (July 2, 2015), http://s-usih.org/2015/07/why-people-who-gaymarry-
need-feminism.html [perma.cc/4YP9-DLAA]; see also Cynthia Godsoe, Marriage Equality and 
the “New” Maternalism,  6 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 145, 147 (“The ongoing gendered stereotypes 
embedded in Obergefell limit marriage equality’s egalitarian power, ultimately restricting 
options for all families”); Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of 
Marriage, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 107, 108 (“I argue in this Essay that Obergefell elevates 
traditionalist concepts of marriage over principles of liberty or equality”); Clare Huntington, 
Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 23 (“[The Court’s 
framing] unnecessarily disrespects people who in good faith have a different view of the social 
front of marriage. And it reifies marriage as a key element in the social front of family, further 
marginalizing nonmarital families.”); Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical 
Legacies of Feminism, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 126, 134 (“Obergefell does not bear the marks of 
feminism’s second legacy—the campaigns against discrimination based on nonmarital 
status.”). 
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I. THE LONG REIGN OF COVERTURE 
Sir William Blackstone, in a famous passage from the first volume of his 
1765 Commentaries, described the doctrine of coverture as follows: 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or 
at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under 
whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is 
therefore called in our law-French a feme-covert. . . .5 
Justice Kennedy, citing this classic definition, reiterated: “Under the 
centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a married man and woman were treated 
by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity.”6 These rules governed 
married women in both England and America until at least the middle of the 
nineteenth century, when states began to enact Married Women’s Property 
Acts, legislation that is generally thought to have ended coverture.7 
Practical economic concerns led courts and legislatures to reconsider the 
rules of coverture because there were “advantages in treating spouses’ assets 
separately: a wife’s property could keep a family solvent if a husband’s 
creditors claimed his assets, and employed married women could support 
their children if their husbands were profligate.”8 Moreover, Justice Kennedy 
mentioned that new social understandings concerning women as legal and 
political rightsholders were gaining traction: “As women gained legal, 
political, and property rights, and as society began to understand that 
women have their own equal dignity, the law of coverture was abandoned.”9 
Despite these motivating factors, coverture was not challenged or 
changed without great effort. Dismantling coverture, the historians’ brief 
remarks, was a contentious undertaking that contravened what many people 
considered to be the natural order of marital relations. The project of 
changing coverture rules was portrayed as destroying a core feature of 
marriage: “To eliminate it was blasphemous and unnatural; the marriage 
bargain was governed by laws of ‘Divine origin’ and subordination was ‘the 
 
 5. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. 
 6. Obergefell, 2584 S. Ct. at 2595 (citing 1 BLACKSTONE supra note 5, at *430). 
 7. See Tait, supra note 1, at 212–24. While married women gained property rights 
pursuant to these statutes, many coverture rules remained in place until late into the twentieth 
century, such as head of household rules. See Allison Anna Tait, A Tale of Three Families: 
Historical Households, Earned Belonging, and Natural Connections, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1345, 
1355 (2012). 
 8. Brief of Historians of Marriage and the American Historical Ass’n as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners at 17, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14-
574) [hereinafter Brief of Historians of Marriage]. 
 9. Obergefell, 2584 S. Ct. at 2595. 
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price which female wants and weakness must pay for their protection.’ ”10 
Many people considered coverture to be an essential component of the 
marriage relationship, and its rules shaped social expectations as well as 
cultural representations of marriage.11 
II. COVERTURE’S RESURRECTION 
The Married Women’s Property Acts and other legal changes did 
gradually eradicate the most obvious facets of coverture. Women became 
property owners, legal actors, and economic deciders. Women came one step 
closer to being equal partners in the marital relationship. Justice Kennedy 
therefore wrote that the ultimate legal rejection of coverture brought about 
by the Married Women’s Property Acts “worked deep transformations in its 
structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by many as essential.”12 
Nevertheless, at the same time that Justice Kennedy described marriage 
as an “institution [that] has evolved in substantial ways over time, 
superseding rules related to parental consent, gender, and race once thought 
by many to be essential,”13 he also reaffirmed certain tenets of coverture. He 
wrote that, “[m]arriage remains a building block of our national 
community,”14 and used metaphors and descriptors that have particular 
rhetorical pedigrees. Describing marriage as a building block of government, 
the keystone of social order, and a transcendent, lifelong relationship, Justice 
Kennedy invoked longstanding tropes that have traditionally been deployed 
in defense of coverture and marriage defined by gender inequality.15 
 
 10. Brief of Historians of Marriage, supra note 8, at 18 (citing BASCH, IN THE EYES OF 
THE LAW 154 (1999)). 
 11. Chief Justice Roberts disputed this historical characterization of the importance of 
coverture to marriage by stating: “If you had asked a person on the street how marriage was 
defined, no one would ever have said, ‘Marriage is the union of a man and a woman, where the 
woman is subject to coverture.’ “  Obergefell, 2584 S. Ct. at 2614 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 12. Obergefell, 2584 S. Ct. at 2595 (citing NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS (2000); HENDRIK 
HARTOG, MAN & WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000)). 
 13. Id. at 2601. 
 14. Id. See generally COTT supra, note 12. 
 15. See Mary Lyndon Shanley, Marriage Contract and Social Contract in Seventeenth 
Century English Political Thought, 32 W. POL. Q. 79, 79 (1979) (“The royalists thought they had 
found in the marriage contract a perfect analogue to any supposed contract between the king 
and his subjects, for marriage was a contract but was in its essence both hierarchical and 
irrevocable. . . . [Parliamentarian and republican writers] gradually extended their 
individualistic premises into the depiction of domestic order.”). 
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A. Marriage as the Building Block of Government 
One of the first statements that Justice Kennedy made about marriage is 
that it “lies at the foundation of government.”16 Justice Kennedy attributed 
this maxim to Confucius and stated that it was “echoed centuries later and 
half a world away by Cicero, who wrote: ‘The first bond of society is 
marriage; next, children; and then the family.’ ”17 The tie between family and 
government has, as Justice Kennedy observed, been an essential one. 
The tie between the family and government has also historically been 
premised on cascading forms of paternal authority and entrenched gender 
hierarchy.18 Early modern political theorists, like Jean Bodin, framed 
governmental structure in terms of the family: “The family [is] not only the 
true source and origin of the commonwealth, but also its principal 
constituent.”19 The family held great significance because its structure both 
confirmed and reinforced the correctness of authoritarian or monarchical 
rule.20 Here, political theorists drew on Aristotle, who posited the family as 
the template of government: “For as household management is the kingly 
rule of a house, so kingly rule is the household management of a city, or of a 
nation, or of many nations.”21 This use of the family as an exemplary 
organizational form culminated in England with Robert Filmer who in 1680 
wrote Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings. In that book, Filmer stated: 
“If we compare the Natural Rights of a Father with those of a King, we find 
them all one . . . as the Father over one Family, so the King as Father over 
many Families extends his care to preserve, feed, cloth, instruct, and defend 
the whole Commonwealth.”22 
This tight connection between polity and family was reconceived in 
American political theory and the central component of the governmental 
analogy shifted from nesting forms of domestic and political power to a 
 
 16. Obergefell, 2584 S. Ct. at 2594 (citing 2 LI CHI: BOOK OF RITES 266 (Ch’u Chai & 
Winberg Chai eds., James Legge trans., 1967)). 
 17. Id. (quoting CICERO, DE OFFICIIS (Walter Miller trans., 1913)). 
 18. See Allison Tait, Family Model and Mystical Body: Witnessing Gender Through 
Political Metaphor in the Early Modern Nation-State, 36 WOMEN’S STUD. Q. 76, 78 (2008) (“In 
the absolutist context, the family unit (in its most conventional makeup) is the primary 
expression of political organization.”). 
 19. JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 6 (M. J. Tooley trans., 1967). 
 20. See JONATHAN DEWALD, ARISTOCRATIC EXPERIENCE AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN 
CULTURE 78 (1993) (“From Bodin in the sixteenth century through Montesquieu in the 
eighteenth, theorists argued that the authority of the polity rested on properly functioning 
families, and above all on proper respect for fathers. Order in the small, familial polity would 
lead to order in the polity at large and to respect for its father, the king.” (footnote omitted)). 
 21. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE, 609 (Richard 
McKeon ed., 1947). 
 22. ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA 24 (1680). 
104 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 114:99 
 
 
robust idea of consent: “[A]s a voluntary union based on consent, marriage 
paralleled the new government. This thinking propelled the analogy between 
the two forms of consensual union into the republican nation’s self-
understanding and identity.”23 Despite this new emphasis, consent-based 
concepts of marriage still retained internal, gendered hierarches. Women 
may have been consenting to marriage, as opposed to being co-opted into 
marital arrangements for purposes of wealth creation or family convenience, 
but these women were nonetheless consenting to a legal relationship—
coverture—in which they had few rights and were ruled by their husbands. 
Fathers and husbands in America were “enlightened patriarchs”; that is to 
say, they were not tyrants but rather heads of household who exercised their 
authority with compassion and wisdom.24 They were, however, still 
patriarchs and, even in America, the idea of marriage as a building block of 
government was connected to female subordination and coverture rules. 
B. Marriage as Key to Social Order 
Another point that Justice Kennedy made in favor of marriage as a 
fundamental right is that “this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions 
make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.”25 Quoting from 
Maynard v. Hill—a case from 1888 that turned not on the question of 
marriage but rather on questions of legislative divorce and marital 
property—Justice Kennedy asserted that marriage “has long been ‘a great 
public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.’ ”26 Because of 
the importance of the family as a unit of governance, commentators have 
conventionally and regularly deemed the family to be a “keystone of our 
social order.” In early modern England, Blackstone observed that “the due 
regulation and domestic order of the kingdom” was connected to the proper 
functioning of “a well-governed family.”27 Alice Kessler-Harris has noted 
likewise that this notion of family as “a keystone of social order”28 resonated 
strongly in Puritan New England and that, by the middle of the nineteenth 
 
 23. COTT, supra note 12, at 10. 
 24.  See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 146 
(1991) (describing “new enlightened standards of paternalism”). 
 25. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). 
 26. Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888)). 
 27. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *162. 
 28. Alice Kessler-Harris, Women, Work, and the Social Order, in LIBERATING WOMEN’S 
HISTORY: THEORETICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 330, 331 (Berenice A. Carroll ed., 1976). 
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century, the family was “understood as the basic social unit, essential to 
social order.”29 
The real question, however, remains unanswered. That is, which social 
order does marriage support? One answer to this question comes from 
Alexis de Tocqueville, who Justice Kennedy quoted: “[W]hen the American 
retires from the turmoil of public life to the bosom of his family, he finds in 
it the image of order and of peace. . . . [H]e afterwards carries [that image] 
with him into public affairs.”30 If this quote is any indication, the social order 
that marriage supports consists of two clearly delineated and separate 
spheres that partition men and women into the dichotomous roles of female 
domesticity and male wage-earning. This vision of marriage is one in which 
a husband braves the “turmoil” of public life and marketplace engagement in 
order to be rewarded at the end of the day with a peaceful home that is 
ordered and run by his wife. 
This ideal social order is constituted by specialized labor and gender-
differentiated roles. A feature of coverture, specialized household labor 
became entrenched at the end of the nineteenth century when “wives’ 
economic contribution to the household was no longer as ‘visible’ as it had 
been in the more subsistence-oriented agrarian economies,” and “[g]rowing 
numbers of men had begun to work outside the household.”31 Because of 
these changes in the social and industrial landscape, household labor 
“increasingly appeared an indistinguishable part of ‘family life.’ ”32 Men 
worked in the paid labor market, striving for financial success, while women 
were to prepare themselves for “a great calling”33—motherhood. 
Homemaking, mothering, and domestic arts “reached mystical proportions” 
and “[f]or a woman to neglect her duty meant social chaos.”34 Motherhood 
frames this social order and its absence indicates social chaos. 
A second answer to the question of which social order marriage 
supports emerges when Justice Kennedy remarked that, without marriage, 
“there would be neither civilization nor progress.”35 The concept of 
“civilization”—like the concept of separate spheres—reinforces particular 
types of social ordering and requires certain forms of marital behavior. 
 
 29. Id. at 332. 
 30. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting 1 ALEXIS 
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 309 (Henry Reeve trans., rev. ed. 1990)). 
 31. Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ 
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1092 (1994). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Kessler-Harris, supra note 30, at 332. 
 34. Id. Nancy Cott, discussing marriage in America at the turn of the nineteenth 
century,  likewise notes that “social order [was] based on male-headed nuclear families.” COTT, 
supra note 12, at 92. 
 35. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)). 
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Norbert Elias writes: “The term ‘civilization’ sums up everything in which 
Western society of the last two or three centuries believes itself superior to 
earlier societies . . . . By this term Western society seeks to describe what 
constitutes its special character and what it is proud of.”36 “Civilization” is, 
accordingly, intimately linked to the perpetual refinement of elite and often-
conservative norms. In the context of marriage and sexuality, “civilization” 
means that “sexuality is confined more and more exclusively . . . [to] socially 
legitimatized marriage”37 as individuals are called upon to exercise self-
restraint and discipline internal drives. 
Correct social ordering in the marriage realm meant keeping up 
appearances and following the “rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and 
good manners.”38 By the mid-nineteenth century the civilizing process 
required “a particularly strict disciplining of sexuality” and the total 
integration of “social commands and prohibitions” into all modes of 
household management and marital relations.39 Katherine Franke has 
shown, from this perspective, how marriage has been used by the American 
government as a “domesticating technology” capable of “lift[ing] people up 
from a natural savage state and mold[ing] them into proper citizens,”40 in 
particular after the Civil War and the freeing of the slaves. Accordingly, the 
rules of civility, like the rules of specialized labor, provide an apparatus for 
conforming marital relations, gender roles, and sexual behavior to collective 
sociocultural norms. 
C. Marriage as a Transcendental, Lifelong Relationship 
A third element that characterizes Justice Kennedy’s description of 
marriage as coverture is his insistence on marriage as a lifelong, 
transcendental undertaking. Justice Kennedy wrote: “The lifelong union of a 
man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, 
without regard to their station in life.”41 And in a similar vein, he also 
asserted that marriage “offers the hope of companionship and understanding 
and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the 
 
 36. NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: SOCIOGENETIC AND PSYCHOGENETIC 
INVESTIGATIONS 5 (Edmund Jephcott trans., 1994). 
 37. Id. at 188. 
 38. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *162. 
 39. Id. at 186. Elias describes bourgeois society and its norms in nineteenth-century 
Europe in comparison with the previous court society that dominated in Ancient Regime 
France and elsewhere in Europe. 
 40. Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African 
American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 252 (1999). 
 41. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (emphasis added). 
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other.”42 To be sure, few couples enter into marriage with the idea of getting 
divorced, and this description of marriage therefore reflects a common, 
aspirational vision of the relationship. But, from a different perspective, the 
description of marriage as a lifelong relationship harkens back to an era 
before the availability of divorce—the era of coverture—when marriage was 
literally a lifelong proposition defined by the near impossibility of exit. 
Until the middle- to late-nineteenth century, both in England and 
America, the lack of real exit opportunities was a defining feature of 
marriage. Grounded in religious theory and the idea of “one flesh,”43 the 
model marriage fit a particular paradigm: “lifelong, faithful monogamy, 
formed by the mutual consent of a man and a woman.”44 Lifelong marriage 
also dovetailed with the concept of coverture, in which a woman became 
unalterably one with her husband at the moment of marriage. Coverture 
“literally expressed the union of the marital pair” and the dictum “till death 
do us part,” was as central a component of coverture as was the unity of 
property or political interests of the married couple.45 
Under coverture rules, there was no real escape for a wife even in cases 
of abuse, unhappiness, or incompatibility. In England, the only way to obtain 
a full divorce (with permission to remarry) was to obtain an Act of 
Parliament. Generally, men obtained a private Act when they were able to 
prove adultery and had sufficient resources to navigate the time- and 
expense-consuming process.46 The more common solution was for the 
spouses to obtain a divorce a mensa et thoro from the ecclesiastical court. 
This was a legal separation that allowed the spouses to live apart and even 
granted alimony to the wives under certain circumstances.47 It was not until 
1857, with the Matrimonial Causes Act, that divorce became more readily 
available and, even then, the social stigma attached to divorce was often 
prohibitive.48 
In American colonies and states, divorce availability varied by 
geography.49 Full divorce was available relatively early in some New England 
 
 42. Id. at 2600 (emphasis added). 
 43. E.g., COTT, supra note 12, at 11, 66. 
 44. Id. at 3. See also Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity 
in Nineteenth-Century America, 5 FEMINIST STUDIES 346, 354 (1979). 
 45. COTT, supra note 12, at 54. 
 46. Tait, supra note 1, at 184. 
 47. Id. at 184–85. 
 48. Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, (Eng.); Tait, supra note 1, at 184. 
 49. See MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 
(1989). 
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states, perhaps because of “reformation roots.”50 Nevertheless, access to 
divorce was both rarely found and rarely employed until the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Even once divorce became more common, spouses had 
to show fault (a requirement that persisted into the 1970s and 1980s in most 
states), meaning that women still did not have guaranteed exit from an 
unhappy or even abusive marriage. 
Consequently, no one knew better that “[c]hoices about marriage shape 
an individual’s destiny”51 than a woman stuck in a lifelong marriage to a 
philandering, abusive, or spendthrift husband. Marriage was lifelong and 
unifying in the context of coverture, and it was both of these things at the 
expense of female identity, agency, and even bodily integrity. Accordingly, 
the idea of lifelong marriage, while aspirational, is also tied to a historical 
notion of marriage defined by coverture, interest unification, and the 
suppression of female agency. 
To be sure, none of these tropes are, nor have they ever been, static. 
They can and have evolved to fit multiple circumstances and cultural 
contexts. Nevertheless, they have primarily been used in the service of 
defending forms of marriage that trade heavily in conventional social 
ordering, specialization of labor, and power asymmetries premised on 
gender differences. Justice Kennedy’s opinion adopted these tropes without 
acknowledging their historical freight, glosses over how we might construct 
or reconstruct them, and invokes them as universal truths rather than 
politicized assertions. 
CONCLUSION 
With the decision in Obergefell, not only did the notion of love win, the 
institution of marriage also won.52 And through it all, a particularly 
conventional iteration of marriage predominated. In Kennedy’s idealistic 
and idealizing concept of marriage, the relationship is important because it 
models good governance, social stability, and enduring commitment. The 
descriptive language that he used, however, invokes not only good 
governance but also gender hierarchy; not only social stability but also social 
prescription; not only enduring commitment but also inescapable burden. 
Consequently, instead of extinguishing dated concepts about the nature of 
 
 50. Judith Areen, Uncovering the Reformation Roots of American Marriage and Divorce 
Law, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29 (2014). 
 51. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
 52. Katherine Franke responds to the victory of marriage equality by posing this 
question: “Given that hundreds of thousands of same-sex couples have legally married, now is 
the time to ask this important, if not painful, question: What have we gotten ourselves into?” 
KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 209 (2015). 
January 2016] The Return of Coverture 109 
marriage and replacing them with a more modern form of marriage, 
grounded in true gender equality and relationship equity, Obergefell signals a 
new life for coverture values. As the French might say, coverture is dead; 
long live coverture. 
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